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RRI as a governance paradigm: 
What is new?
Simone Arnaldi, Guido Gorgoni, Elena Pariotti
This chapter frames Responsible Research and Innova-
tion (RRI) as an emerging governance approach in the 
EU regulatory context. We argue that the reference to 
fundamental rights makes RRI a distinctive approach to 
responsibility compared to other existing paradigms and 
that human rights, in particular those laid down in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, are 
not necessarily a constraint but can instead be a catalyst 
for innovation. We maintain that a governance framework 
based on the complementarity between legal norms and 
voluntary commitments might successfully combine the 
respect for fundamental rights with the openness and 
flexibility of the innovation process.
1.5 RRI and the governance of  
technology1 
RRI deal with situations in which knowledge is uncertain 
and consent is contested, so that traditional approaches 
addressing responsibility ex post facto by the means of 
liability or compensation are unsatisfactory. Instead, RRI 
1 All the authors outlined the structure of the chapter. S. Arnaldi 
wrote Section 2.1; G. Gorgoni wrote Section 2.2; E. Pariotti wrote 
Section 2.3; all authors wrote Section 2.4. The authors have read 
and approved the manuscript.
promotes a more comprehensive approach to respon-
sibility. 
Academic literature and public debates alike have increas-
ingly acknowledged the pervasiveness of uncertainty in 
science, technology and their governance. Uncertainty 
is no longer viewed as a residual area of ignorance and 
risk to be gradually reduced by way of increasing expert 
knowledge and enhanced technological control. It is rath-
er a consequence of the ecological nature of technology, 
which cannot be eliminated, and that its interaction with 
the environment generates (Luhmann 1993). 
As a consequence of the difficulty to predict future devel-
opments and possible risks, we are often only able to learn 
about these developments after technologies have been 
introduced and have shown their consequences for soci-
ety. This way we enter into the domain of “manufactured 
risk” (Giddens 1999) and the unavoidable “secondary con-
sequences” of action (Beck 1999). Indeed, this increasingly 
manipulative knowledge of nature and society produces 
uncertainty rather than reduces it, and this radical un-
certainty reshapes the boundaries between science and 
policy. Knowledge and technology, therefore, implicitly 
incorporate models, world views and societal patterns 
(Wynne 1995), so that “the ways in which we know and 
2The authors  of this  chapter
“RRI can perhaps be 
considered as a new 
paradigm of responsibility 
that goes beyond the 
traditional emphasis on 
fault and punishment, 
risk and compensation, 
uncertainty and 
precaution.” 
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represent the world (both nature and society) are in-
separable from the way in which we choose to live in it.” 
(Jasanoff 2004: 2)
Today, the governance of new technologies is therefore 
designed and implemented in situations that are charac-
terised by uncertain knowledge and embattled consent 
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1983). We argue that RRI can be 
an effective answer to this twofold uncertainty, so that 
responsiveness and the normative steering of research 
and innovation acquire more importance over risk indi-
viduation and management. 
The nature of RRI as a conceptual and policy approach 
aimed at actors’ reciprocal responsibilisation, defines a 
space for innovative forms of governance centred on the 
adoption and the practical implementation of (self-)regu-
latory instruments such as codes of conduct, guidelines, 
technical standards, reporting, and audits. 
Broadly speaking, soft regulation is a set of explicit rules, 
which have either a non-binding character or are ut-
terly voluntary (Fredriksson et al. 2011, Skjærseth et al. 
2006). Soft norms have an acknowledged legal relevance, 
though they lack a formally binding effect, precision, and 
clearly top-down delineated enforcement mechanisms 
(Shaffer and Pollack 2009). Because of this characteristic 
nature, soft norms have often been defined as “non-legis-
lative modes of policy-making” (Hérriet in Fredriksson et al. 
2011: 53) or even as “quasi-legal instruments” (Koutalakis 
et al. 2010: 330). Soft regulation describes a shift “from 
direct intervention (“rowing”) to indirect intervention 
(“steering”) in terms of enabling, motivating and press-
ing the regulated parties to regulate and to comply with 
self-regulation” (Dorbeck-Jung and Shelley-Egan 2013: 56).
Soft regulation is useful to regulators as it constitutes a 
tool for leveraging the information advantages of those 
actors who need to be regulated. This is considered an 
important asset in emerging technological fields that 
are characterised by a high degree of uncertainty and 
for which regulators lack the resources or information 
needed to develop sound “discretion-limiting rules” of a 
mandatory nature as it is: 
 “particularly the case in highly technical areas where the 
state depends on individual producers for crucial regula-
tory information related to product characteristics and 
production processes.” (Koutalakis et al. 2010: 334)
In this context, soft regulation is used in processes where 
“there is the need to build a participated consensus on 
legal and political decisions” (Pariotti 2011: 516) and the 
institutional and organizational configurations of regula-
tory actions: 
“provide little space for different and conflicting interests to 
be articulated. This does not mean that conflicts disappear,
but that they may take other routes, or are put ‘on hold’, 
as it were.” (Garsten and Jacobsson 2013: 422)
The expansion of soft regulation does not replace hard 
law as such, but creates “hybrid” regulatory frameworks; 
this happens when, for instance, a voluntary good practice 
code is used as a benchmark for compliance with a “hard 
law” prescription” (Heyvaert 2009: 650) or, on the contrary, 
when hard law is referred to in broader soft regulatory 
instruments. We maintain that this complementarity is 
just the kind of result that is pursued by the idea of RRI. 
Table 2–1: Soft regulatory initiatives: some examples (source: Arnaldi 2014)
Level of initiative
National / subnational International / supranational
Initiator Public Voluntary Reporting Scheme for Engi-
neered Nanoscale Materials (UK)
(DEFRA 2008a, 2008b)
EPA Nanoscale Materials Stewardship 
Program (EPA n.d.)
OECD Working Party on Nanotechnology
(n.d.)
European Commission Code of Conduct
(2008)
Private Responsible Nanocode (n.d.) ISO TC 229 (ISO n.d.)
ResponsibleCare (ICCA 2006)
1.6 RRI and the evolutions of  
responsibility
RRI has to be examined in the context of the diversity 
and historical evolution of the notion of responsibility. 
Indeed responsibility is “a syndrome of concepts” (Vincent 
2011) variously interconnected (e.g. Davis 2012, van de Poel 
2011, Vincent 2011, Gorgoni 2011, Ricoeur 2000, Hart 1968). 
The different meanings of responsibility can be referred 
to as two distinct poles: a passive pole, relating to the 
imputation of responsibility (being held responsible) and 
an active pole, which is that of the voluntary preventive 
assumption of responsibility.
Indeed, responsibility can be equally understood in terms 
of the obligation to bear the consequences of an action 
(liability), as the capacity to act taking into account one’s 
duties and giving an account of them (accountability), or 
as the capacity to act without relying on general pre-es-
tablished rules or waiting for ex-post accounts, but rather 
by taking into account the specific context (responsiveness). 
The idea of responsiveness is different from that of reac-
tion typically associated with responsibility and is closer 
to the idea of a response, therefore characterising the idea 
of responsibility as both open and active: 
“Response entails previous listening to a question. It entails 
openness, a willingness to understand and confront the 
other’s commitments and concerns with ours, to look for 
a possible terrain of sharing. It entails readiness to rethink 
our own problem definition, goals, strategies, and iden-
tity.” (Pellizzoni 2004: 557)
The distinction between the active and the passive modali-
ties of responsibility implies the distinction between the 
temporal directions of responsibility, namely the retro-
spective and the prospective (Cane 2002). 
Retrospective responsibility, or “historic responsibility” 
(Bovens 1988), is backward-looking, i.e. past-oriented, and 
is essentially linked to the idea of a reaction, which shapes 
the idea of responsibility in terms of sanction, compen-
sation or justification. Responsibility in this case is called 
“retrospective” in that its key moment is the ex post evalu-
ation of a situation.
Prospective responsibility is forward-looking, i.e. future-
oriented, and is essentially linked to the idea of assum-
ing and exercising responsibility, certainly in the sense of 
complying with the duties associated with our roles, but 
also by (pro)actively assuming responsibilities when the 
contents of our duties and tasks are not (or cannot) be 
established in advance. Responsibility is called “prospec-
tive” in that responsibility is not an ex-post judgement 
over a certain state of affairs, but a projection onto it, i.e. 
with no judgement in terms of a subsequent fault or com-
pensation, but rather in terms of commitment. This active 
understanding of responsibility is central in regulatory 
strategies based on responsibilisation, intended as “pre-
disposing actors to assume responsibility for their action” 
(Dorbeck-Jung and Shelley-Egan 2013: 60).
Considering the two semantic poles we described above 
and the predominant time dimension the different under-
standings of responsibility refer to, different paradigms 
of responsibility can be distinguished, according to their 
changing logic in combination with these elements. In 
our view, three main paradigms can be identified, all of 
which coexist despite the fact they were developed un-
der specific historical conditions and therefore they do 
indeed characterise some typical “eras” of responsibility. 
By revisiting the work of François Ewald, we distinguish 
between the following:
1. The paradigm of fault, corresponding to the traditional 
moral and legal idea of responsibility as linked to a 
faulty causation by the agent. This paradigm of respon-
sibility is essentially retrospective as it is based on the 
ex post judgement of a past action, and possibly on 
its sanction, and characterises both the legal and the 
ethical field (e.g. Hart 1968).
2. The paradigm of risk, in which the focus of responsi-
bility is put on guaranteeing victims against damages 
(without reference to anybody's fault), rather than 
on sanctioning the “responsible” person(s), whose in-
volvement in producing or not the damage becomes 
irrelevant under the “objective” logic of compensation. 
This model of responsibility is indeed prospective in 
that it aims at anticipating the occurrence of damages 
by the means of risk management techniques (Beck 
1999). This way responsibility is turned towards the 
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future disclosing opportunities for action (otherwise 
“tied” by the spectrum of fault); but at the same time it 
remains linked to a retrospective logic in that it antici-
pates the occurrence of damage but it does not imply 
a higher responsibilisation of the practices concerned, 
as responsibility is based on statistical and not on ethi-
cal or legal criteria. Thus, paradoxically a sort of de-
responsibilisation in terms of commitment is induced.
3. The paradigm of safety, as a reaction to a situation of 
uncertainty that cannot be domesticated by means 
of risk calculation. This paradigm was inaugurated by 
the development of the idea of precaution, both in the 
ethical and in the legal sense. Indeed the two former 
paradigms of responsibility are seriously challenged 
by the evolution of science and innovation, as they 
both presuppose either an identifiable author (fault) 
or some reliable data on which calculations (risk) are 
based, whilst contemporary science is characterised by 
uncertainty, as the direct or indirect outcomes of in-
novation practices cannot be fully anticipated (e.g. the 
effects of the use of chemical products in agriculture 
and their effects on the ecosystem, the effects of GMO's 
on the biosphere, etc.). Therefore the preventive ap-
proach of risk management cannot provide acceptable 
answers, nor would the fault paradigm help in making 
innovation processes more responsible. Within this 
context of uncertainty the focus of responsibility is put 
on anticipating the undesirable outcomes of techno-sci-
entific activities, basing responsibility on value-centred 
decisions in a context of uncertainty rather than on a 
risk-based approach.
Those paradigms of responsibility coexist, overlap and 
sometimes compete with each other. When compared 
to the RRI idea, it presents some distinctive features that 
we should briefly analyse.
Despite some differences, the literature on RRI shares a 
largely common understanding of responsibility and its 
dimensions (see von Schomberg 2013, Owen 2014, van den 
Hoven et al. 2013, Forsberg et al. 2015):
• Responsibility is oriented to the future: the specific ap-
proach of RRI does not aim only at sanctioning, com-
pensating or preventing the negative consequences of 
innovation; it aims indeed at steering the innovation pro-
cesses according to societal values and needs, therefore 
advocating a prospective idea of responsibility.
• Responsibility is more proactive than reactive: respon-
sibility is intended to be mainly a driving factor of the 
innovation process rather than a constraint, therefore it 
goes beyond the boundaries of what is legally due and 
relies on proactive anticipatory interventions.
• Responsibility is a collective and participative process: 
rather than being individual, responsibility is shared 
across different actors with different roles and powers 
along the innovation process, engaging with the collec-
tive shaping of societally acceptable research and in-
novation trajectories.
• Responsibility is plural: RRI links different dimensions 
of responsibility, namely the political, legal, ethical, and 
economic. Indeed the pursuit of responsible innovation 
rests on the voluntary adoption of standards which are 
not legally binding (ethical dimension of responsibility). 
These standards may become the normative references 
for RRI activities (political dimension of responsibility), 
so that our current “grand challenges” can be answered 
(social dimension of responsibility) respecting and pro-
moting EU Fundamental Rights (legal dimension of re-
sponsibility) at the same time.
These features seem to set RRI apart from the other re-
sponsibility paradigms we have briefly described above 
(see Table 2–2 for an unavoidably simplified comparison). 
It does not mean that it replaces the other ones; rather 
it combines some of their elements in an original, and 
more comprehensive, fashion. Indeed, RRI can perhaps 
be considered as a new paradigm of responsibility that 
goes beyond the traditional emphasis on fault and punish-
ment, risk and compensation, uncertainty and precaution, 
as it aims at steering the innovation process from the inside 
towards societal goals rather than coping with its (actual 
or anticipated) unwanted and unintended externalities.
Table 2–2: RRI and the evolution of responsibility paradigms
Paradigm Fault Risk Safety RRI
Criterion of ascription Liability Damage Uncertainty Responsiveness
Mean of realisation Sanction Compensation Precaution Participation
Target Negative outcomes Negative outcomes Negative outcomes Negative and  positive outcomes
Dimension Individual Systemic Collective Collaborative
Orientation in time Retrospective Prospective /  Retrospective
Prospective /  
Anticipative
Prospective / 
Proactive
Regulating mechanism Hard law Hard law Hard law / Soft law Self-regulation / Soft law / Hard law
1.7 RRI as a governance paradigm
RRI aims at actors’ reciprocal responsibilisation, opening 
to innovative forms of governance centred on the adop-
tion and the practical implementation of (self-)regulatory 
instruments such as codes of conduct, guidelines, techni-
cal standards, reporting, and audits. These types of regu-
latory instruments and their incorporation into hybrid 
regulatory schemes promote participation and power 
sharing, the integration of different levels of governance, 
diversity and decentralization, expansion of the space for 
stakeholders’ deliberation. 
RRI comprehensively combine and integrate various ear-
lier approaches and methods, as:
“technology assessment and foresight, application of the 
precautionary principle, normative / ethical principles to 
design technology, innovation governance and stakehold-
er involvement and public engagement [in both delibera-
tion and regulation].” (von Schomberg 2013: 65)
The literature that is most close to the EU policy environ-
ment from which the notion of RRI originates, includes 
fundamental rights as the source of orientation of re-
search and innovation (von Schomberg 2013, Ozolina et 
al. 2009). In its most cited definition, RRI is defined as:
“a transparent, interactive process by which societal actors 
and innovators become mutually responsive to each other 
with a view to the (ethical) acceptability, sustainability and 
societal desirability of the innovation process and its mar-
ketable products (in order to allow a proper embedding 
of scientific and technological advances in our society).” 
(von Schomberg 2011: 9; 2013: 63)
In this view, ethical acceptability “refers to a mandatory 
compliance with the fundamental values of the EU Charter 
on fundamental rights” (von Schomberg 2013: 63). More-
over, social desirability “captures the relevant and more 
specific normative anchor points of the treaty on the Eu-
ropean Union” (von Schomberg 2013: 64). 
Competitiveness, scientific progress, fundamental rights, 
environmental protection are among the normative an-
chor points of EU research and innovation policies and, 
therefore, it seems reasonable that they play a role as the 
normative “building-blocks” of a governance framework.
The definition of RRI we have cited grants a role to the 
legal dimension of RRI, and, above all, emphasizes the 
integrated presence of multiple dimensions within the 
notion of RRI, like the ethical, political, social and legal 
ones. The reference to fundamental rights could be 
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regarded as a way to rigidly set values and goals, even 
regardless of the development of public debate and pub-
lic opinion. From this point of view, fundamental rights 
could be considered as normative constraints defined 
in a top-down way, limiting the scope and influence of 
public involvement. However, this representation of fun-
damental rights in general and of their specific role in RRI 
is indeed debatable.
Human rights are usually seen from two opposite per-
spectives and both of them should be rejected. According 
to a first view, human rights are abstract ideals, which 
can easily be reduced to rhetorical appeals. According 
to a different one, human rights are expressed by norms 
concerning solely the relationships between citizens and 
their governments or judicial courts. In this understand-
ing, fundamental rights have no relation to public opinion. 
Fundamental rights can, on the contrary, be thought of 
as claims that are justified by strong moral reasons and 
supported by legal norms, suitable to regulate both the 
relations between the government and the citizens (“verti-
cal dimension”), and those between private actors (“hori-
zontal dimension”). 
However, it is important to note that the legal norms sup-
porting such claims are often structurally vague, because 
they have to apply to as many cases as possible. 
The content of those fundamental rights is not established 
once for all in the law-making process, but must be shaped, 
also in a bottom-up manner and by several relevant actors 
during the application stage, like judges but also private 
actors promoting tools of self-regulation. 
In science, technology and innovation, many private actors 
actively self-regulate as they possess the relevant informa-
tion and knowledge, so that the contents of fundamental
rights should emerge in a bottom-up fashion. Therefore, 
it is possible to maintain that fundamental rights are a 
basic reference for RRI and that, nevertheless, the devel-
opment and implementation of such a model should and 
can come to terms with different values and with different 
interpretations of the rights themselves.
When understood in this way, human rights gain a central 
space in RRI as they affect the regulation of innovation 
in several ways: 
1. on a judicial level: the judicial stance contributes to the 
definition of the content of rights. 
2. on a policy level: the protection and promotion of rights 
act as a driver for policy making. 
3. the reference to human rights plays a role also on a 
horizontal level, between private actors, like, for in-
stance, when the most diverse organizations adopt and 
implement social responsibility instruments (codes of 
conduct, self-regulations).
 
Considering fundamental rights as essential elements 
of RRI does not imply the narrowing of the scope and of 
the role of public involvement in defining the objectives 
of research and innovation and their social acceptabil-
ity. It does not mean that the normative standards to be 
complied with and the goals to be pursued are already 
fully set in a top-down manner. Far from it, once listed, 
fundamental rights have to be filled with contents and 
have to be detailed with regard to specific domains, con-
texts, and cases by the means of an open-ended process 
of interpretation and application, where societal values 
and norms can find (and usually find) a way of expression.
The reference to fundamental rights, therefore, does not 
involve any closure to public involvement. They can rather 
be seen as “a public normative practice” (Beitz 2009: 170) in 
which the reference to fundamental rights do not exclude, 
but on the contrary implies the contribution of stakehold-
ers and the public for determining their content and the 
concrete goals to be pursued.
Besides a general reference to safety as a paramount 
criterion for assessing technology and innovation, fun-
damental rights play a key role in assessing the ethical 
acceptability of the innovation process, representing 
“normative anchor points” characterizing the specific Eu-
ropean approach to the ethical and regulatory challenges 
of innovation (Ozolina et al. 2012: 27), in particular with 
reference to the EU charter on fundamental rights (Ozo-
lina et al. 2012: 27, van den Hoven et al. 2013: 58). More-
over, innovation is expected to take account of the societal 
needs “expressed in the Treaty on the European Union”, 
as sustainable development, equality, quality of life (van 
den Hoven et al. 2013: 58). Yet, fundamental rights and 
societal needs are seen as explicitly and mutually linked 
goals of a comprehensive normative framework for the 
governance of science, technology and innovation.
In this sense fundamental rights are not simply constraints 
on innovation that aim to reduce or avoid its undesirable 
or negative consequences by warranting the respect for 
human health, dignity, privacy, etc. Rather, they also con-
cern the shaping of policies, so that rights are not only 
respected and protected, but also promoted by way of 
proactive initiatives.
1.8 Concluding remarks
RRI can be deemed as a governance approach to research 
and innovation practices integrating fundamental rights 
and soft regulatory mechanisms and instruments. The 
efficacy of this approach is based on the combination of 
principle-based and outcome-oriented regulation. We em-
phasized fundamental rights as the main “building blocks” 
of principle-based regulation and, more in general, of this 
framework.
The combination of fundamental rights with soft and 
hybrid regulatory instruments seems particularly apt to 
cope with the situation to which RRI is called to answer. 
In the context of RRI, the reference to fundamental rights 
could be seen as an important component in the constel-
lation of elements determining the ethical acceptability of 
innovation and techno-scientific developments. 
The success of referring to fundamental rights as a solu-
tion to provide “normative anchor points” for RRI requires 
careful examination of the legal and regulatory framework 
in which STI activities are framed in the EU and, at the 
same time, a deliberate effort to construe a governance 
framework designed to ensure the complementarity be-
tween hard and soft regulation, legal norms and voluntary 
commitments.
This situation reflects the RRI focus on actors’ responsi-
bilisation and the appeal to their capacity of committing 
to some goals that are not mandated by law, under the 
perspective of a renewed approach to responsibility. 
The potential of fundamental rights to successfully com-
bine a stable normative orientation with openness and 
flexibility is ultimately a matter of how the basic require-
ments of the constitutional state can be preserved in the 
multilevel and manifold regulation that characterises RRI 
governance approach.
